Introduction
Some of the most interesting recent work on the 'Scottish Enlightenment' has emphasised the extent to which Scottish thinkers sought to understand the psychological foundations of patriotism and cosmopolitanism, and to reconcile the two in benign and politically viable Smith recognised that a cosmopolitan 'love of mankind' was a weakly motivating principle of human nature, both searched for ways of tempering the most malign expressions of national animosity in modern politics and, in Smith's famous formulation, of separating the 'mean' principle of national prejudice from the 'noble' principle of love of country. 5 The purpose of this article is to reconstruct a significant Scottish alternative to both the 6 First of all, both Ferguson and Kames laid special emphasis on the 'unsociable' characteristics of human nature, which in turn explained the enmities that characterised relations between independent societies. The point here was not that human beings were naturally 'selfish' or egoistic -an emphasis on self-love was very prominent in both Hume and Smith -but rather that human nature was characterised by a principle of 'dissension', 'animosity', or 'aversion' that had significant consequences for national spirit', but 'their passionate ardour seems rather to require some moderation. ' 6 The term 'unsociable patriotism' is designed to emphasize contrasts with the idea of 'sociable patriotism', as this term has been used to capture the thinking of the critics of Hobbes and Rousseau in the eighteenth century. For an explicit use of 'sociable patriotism' see Béla Kapossy, Iselin contra Rousseau: Sociable Patriotism and the History of Mankind (Basel, 2006) . I also use the term 'agonistic' patriotism as a way of highlighting the vital role of rivalry, contest and antagonism -as opposed to mere enmity -in generating patriotism. While Greek in origin, the distinction between rivalry and enmity comes out very clearly in These facts ensured that the dynamics of human association -in tribes, communities, or nations -were inseparable from the rivalries and antagonisms generated towards outsiders.
As Ferguson put it: 'Our attachment to one division, or to one sect, seems often to derive much of its force from an animosity conceived to an opposite one: and this animosity in its turn, as often arises from a zeal in behalf of the side we espouse, and from a desire to vindicate the rights of our party.'
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The Ferguson's discussion can also be situated against wider eighteenth-century debates about the precise sequencing of the balance between sociability and war in the history of state This picture of permanent and natural enmity among independent nations was a prominent feature of the history of mankind set out in the Essay. Referring to the almost constant divisions among 'rude nations' (savages and barbarians), Ferguson argued that 'in barbarous times, mankind, being generally divided into small parties, are engaged in almost perpetual hostilities'. He noted 'the repugnance to union, the frequent wars, or rather the perpetual hostilities, which take place among rude nations and separate clans', which showed 'how much our species is disposed to opposition, as well as to concert.' Primitive tribes were, he 25 According to Cleinias, the ancient legislator of Crete 'condemned the mindlessness of the many, who do not realize that for everyone throughout the whole of life an endless war exists against all cities…For what most humans call peace he held only to be a name; in fact, for everyone there always exists by nature an undeclared war among all cities. If you look at it this way, you are pretty sure to find that the lawgiver of the Cretans established all our customs, public and private, with a view to war, and that he handed down the laws to be guarded according to these principles'. See Plato, Laws, trans. and ed. Thomas L. Pangle (Chicago, 1980), 4 (625e-626b 53 In the important second essay of this work, Kames engaged critically with the moral theories of both Hutcheson and Hume, and in later editions criticised Rousseau's radical denial of natural sociability and his emphasis on self-love as a principle of morality. 54 As we shall see, the complex depiction of sociability set out in this work had some relevance when in a solitary state. 58 A more difficult question was whether sociability embraced 'the whole species' or was 'in any manner limited'. 59 Kames straightforwardly denied that human beings, or any other animals for that matter, had an appetite for associating with the entire species. Rather, mankind had always been divided into small-scale tribes and societies. This could even be seen in large territorial states like the Roman Empire, in which smaller-scale Kames's insistence on the strength of the principle of aversion in human nature had a number of broader implications. First and foremost, it was part of a wider emphasis on the 'unsocial'
propensities of human nature. According to Kames, man was a 'compound of principles and passions, some social, some dissocial.' 65 Nevertheless, this compound structure was a crucial part of nature's providential purpose for humanity (there are some resemblances here with Kant's view that unsocial sociability formed part of a 'hidden plan of nature'). 66 The fact that human sociability was limited to the formation of small-scale societies served beneficial purposes: 'Every work of Providence contributes to some good end: a small tribe is sufficient for mutual defence; and a very large tribe would find difficulty in procuring subsistence.' encompassing the entire human community, and only gently weakening as it spread outwards 69 Kames, Essays, 55. 70 Kames, Sketches, II, 355. In the Essays, Kames insisted that humans had no natural benevolence towards all of mankind. But he did identify a 'happy contrivance of nature' by which abstract terms like 'our religion, our country, our government, or even mankind' could become objects of genuine and intense affection. Kames argued that the ordinary human capacity for abstract thought enabled people to transfer the intense affections that they usually would only feel for particular individuals to abstract concepts: 'Nothing more ennobles human nature than this principle of action: nor is there anything more wonderful, than that a general term which has no precise meaning, should be the foundation of a more intense affection than is bestowed, for the most part, upon particular objects, even the most attractive…By this curious mechanism, the defect of our nature is amply remedied. Distant objects, otherways invisible, are rendered conspicuous: accumulation makes them great; and greatness brings them near the eye: affection is preserved, to be bestowed entire, as upon a single object.' See Kames, Essays, 43-44.
through the various 'Systems' that made up the largest 'System' of mankind. For Kames, by contrast, animosity was at its strongest among immediate neighbours: the 'nearer they are to one another, the greater is their mutual rancour and animosity'. free constitution was seen as the fundamental mechanism for maintaining patriotic feelings.
Patriotism depended on the emergence of a common language and the possession of a shared territory (patria), but it was far more than a shared affection for a familiar locality. Rather, In the original state of hunters, there being little connection among individuals, every man minds his own concerns, and selfishness governs. The discovery that hunting is best carried on in company, promotes some degree of society in that state: it gains ground in the shepherd state, and makes a capital figure where husbandry and commerce flourish. Private concord is promoted by social affection; and a nation is prosperous in proportion as the amor patriae prevails. But wealth, acquired whether by conquest or commerce, is productive of luxury, and every species of sensuality.
As these increase, social affections decline, and at last vanish…And thus, in the progress of manners, men end as they began: selfishness is no less eminent in the last and most polished state of society, than in the first and most rude state. 77 Kames added to this in the sketch on the rise and fall of patriotism by claiming that patriotism was best underpinned by struggle, emulation and rivalry. Nothing was more favourable to patriotism than the successful struggles for liberty made by citizens against domestic tyrants or foreign oppressors. A 'nation in that state resembles a comet, which, in passing near the 77 Kames, Sketches, I, 178-9, 202-04.
sun, has been much heated, and continues full of motion.' 78 The struggles of small states for liberty or independence were followed by rapid advances in the fine arts, sciences, and public institutions. Purely domestic competition among equals for honours, glory and prestige was also a significant source of patriotic virtue:
One who makes a figure rouses emulation in all: one catches fire from another, and the national spirit flourishes: classical works are composed, and useful discoveries made in every art and science. Liberty, indeed, and many other advantages, were procured to them by the union of the two kingdoms; but these salutary effects were long suspended by mutual enmity, such as commonly subsists between neighbouring nations. Enmity wore away gradually, and the eyes of the Scots were opened to the advantages of their present condition: the national spirit was roused to emulate and excel: talents were exerted, hitherto latent; and Scotland, at present, makes a figure in arts and sciences, above what it ever made while an independent kingdom.
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The passage suggests that Kames believed that productive forms of national emulation could take place between two national groups in the context of a single political state. But war is necessary for man, being a school for improving every manly virtue; and Providence renders kings blind to their true interest, in order that war may sometimes take place. To rely upon Providence in the government of this world, is the wisdom of man.
Upon the whole, perpetual war is bad, because it converts men into beasts of prey;
perpetual peace is worse, because it converts men into beasts of burden. To prevent such woful degeneracy on both hands, war and peace alternately are the only effectual means; and these means are adopted by Providence. 88 Kames's explicit justification of war as as a providential school for virtue and civilization was perhaps the most extreme expression of the language of 'unsociable' patriotism in eighteenth-century Scotland. Nevertheless, he offered one mitigating observation. Kames suggested that wars in the eighteenth century were no longer the scenes of violence and cruelty they had been in the past. Like many other contemporary writers, he stressed that the progress of civilization had led to the establishment of laws of war and to a distinction between civilian and military personel. This meant that wars between large modern states were no longer animated by the personal resentment that characterised ancient and barbarous wars, and could instead be seen as a positive force for the formation of virtue and courage:
One would imagine war to be a soil too rough for the growth of civilization; and yet it is not always an unkindly soil. War between two small tribes is fierce and cruel: but a large state mitigates resentment, by directing it not against individuals, but against the state. We know no enemies but those who are in arms: we have no resentment against others, but rather find a pleasure in treating them with humanity. Cruelty, having thus in war few individuals for its object, naturally subsides; and magnanimity in its stead transforms soldiers from brutes to heroes. 89 Kames concluded that 'war carried on in that manner, would, from desolation and horror, be converted into a fair field for acquiring true military glory, and for exercising every manly virtue.'
90

Conclusion
The language of 'unsociable' patriotism that ran through the writings of Ferguson and Kames represents a significant contribution to Enlightenment debates about the causes of political association, the history of civilization and the prospect of reforming the eighteenth-century state system. Grounded on the insight that sociability was a principle of division as well as union -and that the human species was as much disposed to 'opposition' or 'aversion' as it was to 'friendship' or 'concert' -their accounts must be distinguished from two prominent alternative eighteenth-century perspectives on sociability. On the one hand, Ferguson's and
Kames's insistence that humans were naturally sociable distinguished their thinking from that 89 Kames, Sketches, I, 196-97. 90 Kames, Sketches, I, 199, n. By way of conclusion, it is perhaps worth emphasising that this line of thinking was by no means a peculiarity of eighteenth-century Scottish thought. Rather, similar ideas about the importance of national rivalry in sustaining patriotism and vigilance were put forward by many European thinkers in the second half of the eighteenth century. Among these was the French writer, the abbé Mably, who referred explicitly to the positive effects of 'jealousy and discord' in forestalling the enervation of the ancient Greek republics. 92 The young Swiss 91 In order to understand some of the ways in which this contrasted with Adam Smith, see Forman-Barzilai, Adam Smith and the Circles of Sympathy, According to Mably, 'jealousy and discord' between the Greek states served to maintain Greece's ability against external enemies: 'Without this fermentation, the Citizens, enervated by employment merely Civil, and a long cessation of military toils, would never have been able to have defended their country against a Foreign Enemy. It was to her distrusts, her jealousies, and her disputes, that Greece became indebted for soldiers and for Generals,
